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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
The Court of Appeals affirmed an order compelling defendant to submit to
arbitration all three contracts holding that Section 1449 was sufficiently com-
plied with.
The Court ruled, as they did here, that the second part of Section 1449
requires that the writing be signed, but the first part of the Section-the part
that deals with a contract to arbitrate a controversy thereafter arising-need
only be in writing and does not need to be signed.
ARBITRATION AwARD OF SPECIFIC PEPFORMSANCE
On a motion to confirm an arbitration award of specific performance,
2 4
the Court of Appeals, in Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Iris Construction
Co.,25 was faced with the following situation: defendant repudiated its promise
to build a store for plaintiff in a proposed nine million dollar shopping center,
giving as cause plaintiff's inordinate delay in approving final plans for the
structure. The delay was alleged to have caused investors to regard the project
as a poor risk (plaintiff was the largest tenant), thus making it impossible for
defendant to obtain iortgage financing. The dispute was submitted, under
the terms of the contract, to the American Arbitration Association for resolu-
tion.25 The arbitrators found that plaintiff had acted in good faith in regard
to the approval of building plans and, therefore, that defendant had no basis
for repudiation; that mortgage financing was available, even if more costly
and, therefore, that defendant could not plead impossibility of performance.
The findings resulted in an award ordering defendant to proceed with con-
struction.
In affirming decisions of Special Term27 and the Appellate Division- s
confirming the arbitration award of specific performance, the Court of Appeals
held that, assuming the Court could overturn an arbitration award of specific
performance on the basis that it would have discretion to overturn a similar
decree of equity, this award is neither inconsistent with the relief available
in equity or an overreaching of the arbitrators' power, and should, therefore,
be confirmed.
The Civil Practice Act, Sections 1462 and 1462-a dearly label the grounds
upon which the court may vacate an arbitration award. Section 1462(4) pro-
vides that the award'may be vacated "Where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award
upon the subject-matter was not made." Among the provisions this stands
as the only one permitting an exercise of judicial discretion. The first question
for the Court became, then, what is the measure of that discretion? Is it, as
24. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1461.
25. 8 N.Y.2d 133, 202 N.YS.2d 303 (1960).
26. The rules under which this body operates specifically provide that the arbitrators
may grant specific performance as a remedy.
27. 9 Misc. 2d 796, 168 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
28. 7 A.D.2d 367, 183 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1st Dep't 1959).
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the defendant contended, as broad as the discretion the Court would have in
examining a decree of Equity? Or, are the courts, as plaintiff claimed, re-
stricted in their scrutiny of arbitration awards by the limiting language of Sec-
tion 1462 taken together with the purpose of the Arbitration Act as a whole; 29
that is, to relieve the chronic congestion of court calendars while at the same
time giving the force of law to decisions which potential litigants have agreed
to be bound by?
The majority, as it did in In re Ruppert30 and in In re Staklinski,3'
seems to have rejected the defendant's contention and found that the courts
are under a duty to protect the integrity of arbitration awards when it can
reasonably be said that the arbitrators have acted with discretion. In the
Ruppert case the arbitrators enjoined a labor union from striking, the injunc-
tion remedy being provided for by American Arbitration Association rules.
It was admitted by the plaintiff therein that an equity court could not have
granted the same relief due to a statutory prohibition. The Court said, "Once
we have held that this particular agreement . . .contemplates the inclusion
of an injunction in such award, no ground remains for invalidating this
award.' '32 In the Staklinski case the arbitrators awarded specific performance
of an employment contract in favor of the employee. The Court, in affirming,
said, "Whether a Court of Equity could issue a specific perjornmawe decree in
a case like this is beside tMe point."33 (emphasis supplied). In the present case
the majority again has recognized that the decree may be thought one not
likely to have emanated from a court of equity. But, they say, it is also true
that an equity court could have, in its discretion, reached the same result.
This last argument settles the question for the majority, for if the decree was
within an equity court's discretion, no basis remains for vacating the award.
However, the cases cited by the majority in support of this position do not
deal with projects in any way approaching the enormity of the one here in-
volved, and thus some doubt is cast on the conclusion that this is "... an
ordinary building contract."3 4
The dissent, while not expressing its opinion as to the proper standard
for testing an arbitration award, differs from the majority view that this exer-
cise of discretion was justified on the facts, or that courts of equity have
enforced such contracts from the earliest days to the present time.
Against the plaintiff's assertion that the court will find no problem in
enforcing the award--due to the presence of completed construction plans-
is the bald fact that disputes will undoubtedly arise in a project of this size,
and that the court will have to take time from already crowded dockets to
29. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act, Art. 84.
30. 3 N.Y.2d 576, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958).
31. 6 N.Y.2d 159, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1958).
32. Supra note 30 at 581, 170 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1958).
33. Supra note 31 at 163, 188 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1958).
34. Supra note 25 at 138, 202 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1960).
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resolve them. Further, the grant of specific performance in such a situation
is contrary to at least two well-established principles of Equity; namely, that
the court will not grant such awards when they will prove to be futile, op-
pressive or inequitable 35 (defendant cannot get the mortgage financing and
will not be able to comply without it), nor will specific performance be granted
in contracts requiring continuous supervision over a long period of time36
(plaintiff estimates that the project will take nine months to a year to con-
plete). Finally, the question may be raised as to whether the award is "mutual,
final, and definite" as is required by Section 1462. Plaintiff's store represents
one-half the total cost of the project, and consequently, if defendant is com-
pelled only to build one-half of the shopping center, it would appear that the
award is open to some question on the basis of its finality.
Taking into consideration the necessity of preserving the sanctity of
arbitration awards, this writer feels that the Court, in its desire to avoid
trampling upon the intent of the Legislature and to a lesser extent, in its
quest to insure a comity of decision, has sacrificed the sound and time-tested
rules by which decrees of specific performance may be Judged good or bad.
An opposite decision here could have meant that the court had found the
decision of the arbitrators offensive in one of the respects set out in sub-
division four, and, if this was the interpretation, no damage would be done
the arbitration process. An opposite decision would not have signified a with-
drawal from the position taken in the Ruppert and Staklinski cases. In those
cases the question before the Court was whether the best interests of the
litigants would be served by affirmance of the award. Here, the Court must
also consider its own continuing interest in the proceedings.
If the line of decision from Ruppert to Staklinski, and now, to Grayson,
indicates the development of a new dichotomy in the law, one may ask if it
is necessary. If the purpose of arbitration is speedy justice, does this mean the
court must tolerate gross inconsistencies between its own conception of justice
and the intuitions of laymen in order. to insure the efficacy of arbitration?
This question is left unresolved in the present case.
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING PUBLIc ENTITY
Section 3813 of the Education Law provides that "No action or special
proceeding... shall be prosecuted or maintained against any school district...
unless it shall appear ... that a written verified claim ... was presented within
three months after the accrual of such claim."
The issues presented in Board of Education v. Heckler Electric Co.37
were: (1) whether this statute applied to the commencement of arbitration
35. In re Feuer Transportation, 295 N.Y. 87, 65 N.E.2d 178 (1946).
36. Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Copper Co., 157 N.Y. 60, 51 N.E. 408 (1898).
37. 7 N.Y.2d 476, 199 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1960).
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